The Trump Victory And Two Sorts Of Racism

“Northern and southern racism are different. Southern racists don’t care how close blacks get, as long as they don’t get too high. Northern racists don’t care how high they get, as long as they don’t get too close.”

Sadly, I can’t remember where I read those words or who wrote them, but I have found them very useful for understanding American society for many years since. I now think you can’t understand the transition from Obama to Trump without them.

 

 

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So to back up a bit. Since the election plenty of people have been having their say on what could cause America to elect such an obviously unsuitable, and deeply unpopular, candidate to the presidency. Most of the debate has been framed as bigotry versus economics. Crikey has presentedof both sides, with Bernard Keane pushing the former and Guy Rundle and Helen Razer the latter (ok Razer basically asserting the latter and denouncing anyone who disagrees with her, without providing, you know, evidence)

I’m always deeply suspicious of anyone who claims to be able to explain something as complex as an election before the results have finished being counted, particularly if they didn’t predict the outcome. So I’ve held off for a while. But I tam not convinced that, like the blind men around the Republican elephant, both sides have got hold of part of the truth without representing the full picture. And I think the quote at the top helps bring things together.

The race/gender advocates not only have the problem that almost none of them picked the outcome, they also have to explain how it is that a country, and five states, that elected Barak Hussein Obama twice would be racist enough to elect Trump.

Now consider that quote. Of course it oversimplifies things – some people are racist both ways, some in neither. And no doubt the distinction between the two groups doesn’t neatly follow the Mason-Dixon line. Nevertheless, there is a fair amount of truth to it. Rich southern whites invited black maids and nannyies into their houses and poorer ones accepted them as neighbours as long as their low status was maintained. Northern whites were happy to have a black College Dean or mayor, but moved out the minute blacks started entering their neighbourhood.

Obama’s results fit this pattern very well. Obama actually did worse than Kerry or Gore through Appalachia, where traditionally Democrat voters couldn’t stomach a black man in the White House. But he did very well in the midwest, leading people to conclude that racism there was over.

Why then would people turn to Trump? It’s not just that his strongest supporters were also the most racist. Those who argue for economics as the reason blame the poor economic conditions and a desperate hope for return to the good jobs of the post-New Deal era. Yet Trump’s greatest success was not with those at the bottom of the economic pile, but those earning at least $50,000 a year, and often much more. Some have argued that his supporters were those who feared losing out – they had seen those around them lose their jobs and worried they were next.

But in fact, the areas that swung most strongly to Trump were not those that had been hit hardest. In many cases it was the opposite. Counties experiencing a mini-economic boom swung to Trump by often huge margins. As this article notes, the areas that really went for Trump were the ones where the creation of new, albeit low-paying, jobs saw the arrival of immigrants  through the Obama years. Latinos, not blacks, were getting too close. They hadn’t arrived in sufficient numbers to make a difference with their votes – and many of them aren’t citizens anyway – but they scared the pants off the inhabitants of what had previously been all-white counties. Trump’s biggest swings correlate very well indeed  with these newly heterogeneous counties. It won him the decisive states of Michigan, Wisconsin and Pennsylvania, and possibly Iowa and Ohio to boot.

If you don’t believe the claim that the arrival of ethnic minorities in previously homogenous communities can shake people, take a look at the study presented here.

But that doesn’t mean those arguing for bigotry have the whole elephant. Falling economic conditions for middle and working class Americans were decisive. But any shifts to voting for Trump from this source were small. Instead the effect is seen in who stayed home. We know much less about what influenced non-voters than what drove the votes of those who did go to the polls, but what we do know  suggests that millions of normally solid Democrats didn’t vote, in large part out of frustration at the failure of their party to address their economic concerns.

The combination of whites sufficiently appalled by the brown faces turning up at the local supermarket, and people of all shades feeling Clinton didn’t offer enough to make it worth standing in line for hours, was a double punch that put a buffoon into office.

These, of course, are only the two biggest factors. The blatant lack of democracy of the electoral college was obviously decisive as well. Voter suppression laws, fake news sites, email hacking and FBI interference may each have been big enough to swing things on their own, and certainly were collectively.

But for those trying to learn lessons for next time, or apply them to the rest of the world, I think the place to start is with white identity politics as the driver for right-wing votes, and the failure to address economic insecurity as the reason turnout was low enough that this could win.

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A few last minute thoughts on tomorrow’s election:

No time to edit, just throwing this up there:

I think the most likely outcome is that Clinton will win by somewhat more than the polls predict. This is followed by a narrow Clinton win.

Nevertheless, I also think the polls could be wrong in the other direction, and the chance of Trump winning is at least 10%. Add in the possibility of a win for Clinton so close that refusal to accept the result extends beyond a small core of Trump supporters, and this is seriously scary stuff.

During the primaries I hoped the Republicans would nominate Trump, primarily because I thought he was the most beatable candidate. But I also thought he might do less damage than most of the other Republican candidates. On this, I now think I was very, very wrong.

I thought that his erratic positions and lack of attention would stop him driving much of an agenda, and what he had would cut across that of Congressional Republicans enough that much would be blocked anyway.

As a number of people have noted before me, the supine reaction of most Republicans up to this point suggests we shouldn’t be counting on any opposition from there. Moreover, while Trump might struggle to stay on message, that doesn’t apply to the people he would surround himself. Trump has pretty much hired the alt-right to run his campaign, and while there are differences in the details of their goals, they also have a hit list of things they agree on and have been plotting for a long time. When you look at what gamergate did, the consequences of putting these people in charge of America’s guns is genuinely terrifying. And who is going to stop them – the FBI?

Most crucially though, there is the point that Jonathan Chait has made, which most of us missed. Throughout all of Trumps changes over 30 years two things remain consistent. One is his narcissism, but the other is his belief that the violent crushing of dissent is not just legitimate, but desirable. How will a man who congratulated the Chinese government on slaughtering protesters in Tiannamin Square, not out of a desire to suck up to them, but through genuine endorsement, respond to the next DAPL protests.

Previously I thought that a Trump presidency would be four years of hell, but would at least have the reward of destroying the Republican Party. Now I seriously question whether, if Trump wins, there will ever be another election in the US that seriously deserves that name.

I’ve been wanting to write a longer piece about the debate about building an alternative to the two party system. I doubt I will get it done. Having once been very prone to hyperbole, I’ve tried to put it behind me. But I seriously would question whether, if Trump wins, there is any meaning to such an idea. I think it is highly probable that a President Trump would be giving orders that any serious opposition to his administration be exterminated, be that in the form of Congressional Democrats or prominent activists, and I’m not at all sure those orders wouldn’t be carried out.

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One Term Government? Saved By the Swan?

Not long after the last election I wrote why I thought it more likely than not that the Abbott government would not be re-elected, at least with a majority in its own right. It’s been one of the few posts that keeps on getting a steady trickle of views. Looking back, I think most of what I had to say holds up well. My problem was that I underestimated just how unpopular Abbott would be.

I thought, rightly, that the government would have to be a long way behind in the polls for a long time before they would dump Abbott for someone else. I didn’t expect just how far behind they would actually be, and for how long. Moreover, I didn’t anticipate Campbell Newman losing the Queensland election, and the psychological effect this would have on Liberal Mps.

I am quite confident that if Abbott was still PM this election would be a walkover for Labor. The shine has come off Turnbull, but he is still what is keeping the Liberals in the race. I didn’t predict this particular black swan, but I think I did allow for the possibility of a black swan saving them.

1280px-Black_swan_jan09 Taken byfir0002 | flagstaffotos.com.auCanon 20D + Canon 400mm f/5.6 L – Own work, GFDL 1.2, wikimedia commons

why I thought it more likely than not that the Abbott government would not be re-elected, at least with a majority in its own right. It’s been one of the few posts that keeps on getting a steady trickle of views. Looking back, I think most of what I had to say holds up well. My problem was that I underestimated just how unpopular Abbott would be.

I thought, rightly, that the government would have to be a long way behind in the polls for a long time before they would dump Abbott for someone else. I didn’t expect just how far behind they would actually be, and for how long. Moreover, I didn’t anticipate Campbell Newman losing the Queensland election, and the psychological effect this would have on Liberal Mps.

I am quite confident that if Abbott was still PM this election would be a walkover for Labor. The shine has come off Turnbull, but he is still what is keeping the Liberals in the race. I didn’t predict this particular black swan, but I think I did allow for the possibility of a black swan saving them.

The fact that Labor is still in with a chance – at least of creating a deliberative (far better word than hung) parliament – is a testament to how unpopular the coalition’s policies have been. If they were also fighting against of a hated Newman government in its second term, not even Turnbull’s popularity could save them.

So where now. I think the most likely thing is either a narrow Liberal majority, or a delibarative parliament with the Coalition having more seats than Labor, and probably being put into government by the Independents and Xenophon Mps on that basis.

But whichever happens, their unpopularity will grow, and next time they are going to need not just one black swan moment, but a flock of them, if they are to win again.
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By Sergio Valle Duarte – Own work, CC BY 3.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=37046084
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What’s Really On The Line In the Brexit Vote

Obama raised eyebrows with his intervention into the debate about whether the UK should leave the European Union. The thing that struck me the most about this, however, was that he touched on, if only slightly, the thing that has been almost entirely ignored in almost everything else I have read on the debate, even from those who should know better. This strikes me as strange because, as important as issues of immigration, sovereignty and economics may be, there is something far more important: The EU’s role in maintaining peace.

There are plenty of reasons to dislike the EU, but if you really think bad monetary policy and the over-subsidization of agriculture, or even forced austerity, are the worst things in the world, I suggest you have a chat with a refugee from Syria, Iraq or the DRC. Alternatively, go and stand in one of the apparently endless fields of crosses marking the war dead from the First World War. Or an unrepaired bombsite from the second. Or Aushwitz. It was a repetition of these things the EU was intended to prevent.

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So forgotten is the EU’s purpose that I have had conversations with highly educated Australians who were amazed to discover that peace was even an objective of its founders. Yet how could it not have been? The groundwork was laid in the late 1940s and 1950s by people who had, almost without exception, lost loved ones or limbs in one of the two horrific conflicts that devastated Europe in the first half of the 20th Century. In that era, little was done in diplomatic circles without the awareness of the need to prevent a repetition.

Others acknowledge this was a reason for the EU’s predecessors to come into existence, but see it as an overreaction to a couple of aberrant atrocities in an otherwise largely peaceful history.

This is deeply wrong. When the first stirrings of what became the EEC, and eventually the EU, were founded, the original six members would have struggled to name a period of any length where all of them had been at peace at once. The longest continuous period without war for the six was 43 years, starting in 1871. It didn’t end well. Before that, they were lucky to get a decade in which no armies marched across the plains of one state or another. The history of Eastern Europe was no better. This is the case not just for centuries, but millennia. We now know largescale warfare in Germany goes back more than 3000 years.

The contrast since then is remarkable. For the founding six, it is now 71 years without war on their home soil. Certainly other conflicts have sometimes brought terrorism to their doors, but in terms of homegrown conflicts the worst, even among later arrivals, have been the Northern Ireland troubles and the struggle for Basque independence. Both have brought a terrible toll, but combined have killed fewer people than a single hour on the Somme or during the bombing of Dresden.

Moreover, the EU may be a big part of the reason these smaller conflicts are fast disappearing in our rear view mirror. When a substantial portion of your governance comes from Brussels, people feel less inclined to kill others over whether the remaining portion will be from London or Dublin.

It’s possible of course, that this is coincidence. That the arrival of a completely unprecedented period without war and the creation of an institution carefully crafted to bring peace just happened to occur together. Maybe. But it’s not very likely. Plenty of explanations for Western Europe’s modern peace have been offered. Most are things that are enhanced by the existence of the EU – democracy, trade, economic growth. Others are looking increasingly improbable as explanations – fear of the soviets, nuclear weapons – now that the wall has been down for nearly three decades and France and Germany show no signs of getting back to slaughtering each other.

Amazingly, I’ve even seen people argue the EU doesn’t stop wars because of the dreadful violence in Bosnia, Chechnya and the Ukraine. Umm… that’s what happens when you’re not part of the club. It would be great if the EU could create peace across the entire continent, or maybe keep its members from invading Africa and Asia. But stopping war at home was the primary intent, and success on that alone justifies its existence. It’s not as though all those other wars would have been avoided if the EU hadn’t been there.

Another argument is that we needed the EEC to prevent war, but it did its job, and around the time it became the EU it could have been wound up instead, and eternal peace would still reign. I can’t prove this wrong, but you’d want to be pretty convinced of this dubious theory before you decided to scrap an institution that’s probably the reason no one has dropped a bomb on your bedroom.

The final argument is that it may be terribly important that the French, German and Benelux stay together, and possibly the more recent members, but the UK doesn’t need to be in. True, it is unlikely that Brexit, should it occur, will lead to a revival of the war within the boundaries of Great Britain – Culloden is indeed long ago. An exit might stir renewed violence in Northern Ireland, but some might consider that a few dozen deaths a year a price worth paying.

While this argument is stronger than the rest, that’s a low bar. A UK exit will weaken the EU, placing it in more danger of collapse, and certainly make it harder for it to absorb new members.

Moreover, a UK exit could go two ways: It could lead to the economic catastrophe some have predicted, driving up unemployment and poverty, with all their associated evils. Terrible as that would be for the UK, it’s actually the good outcome for everyone else. Because the alternative is that leaving the EU is seen as a viable option, something every authoritarian leader stymied in his plans to oppress ethnic or religious minorities by the EU can wave in the face of nervous citizens.

Already Hungary is ruled by monsters whose firm desire to commit genocide on vulnerable minorities is stymied only by EU membership. The new government if Poland is possibly worse. EU membership is keeping people alive. How long after a successful Bexit, should it occur, will these countries stay in.

Even if you are entirely indifferent to the survival of Hungary’s Romany, or its few remaining Jews, consider this: If a UK exit sets off a chain reaction, how immune will Britain be from the wars that follow? Even if there is no repeat of the military engagement, no bombs raining on Leicester and Coventry, I doubt things will go well for Britain in such circumstances. If you think the small proportion of Syrian refugees making it across the Channel are a problem, wait until it is millions of French and Belgians, or even Czeck and Slovaks, desperate for somewhere to go.

Maybe such scenarios are unlikely – although the entire weight of history argues otherwise – but if there is even a chance they will occur, what could possibly drive one to want to take the risk?

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What Are New Yorker’s Deciding? Probably Hilary’s Second Term

New York is about to start voting as I write this, so it is possible that what I write will be proven stupid in very quick time. But nothing ventured, nothing gained. Here is my take on what is really at stake.

First up, as noted previously, I think Clinton will almost certainly be the Democrat nominee. For Sanders to beat her he will have to exceed expectations not only today, but over and over again all the way to California. A single slip would be fatal.

I also think the Republican nominee will be either Trump or Cruz. The claims for Kasich or some other white knight riding a dark horse don’t make much sense.

Should I be right about both of these, I think Clinton has a better than 80% chance of winning the election. Trump and Cruz are both terrible general election candidates. Only something really dramatic like a major terrorist attack could see them beat a candidate most Americans don’t like much, but have see as competent and mainstream.

However, which of Trump and Cruz wins could have big implications down the track. If Trump wins, Cruz will be very well positioned to be the Republican candidate in 2020. Much as the establishment might try to stop him, it’s hard to see how they beat him unless he beats himself. Which I think will put Hilary in a very good position to win a second term.

On the other hand, if Cruz wins the nomination, but is beaten by Hilary, he’s unlikely to get another go. Sure his supporters might blame it on disloyalty from Trump or some such, but the pressure for an apparently more moderate candidate, be it Ryan, Kasich or Rubio, will be much stronger. And such a candidate would have a very good chance of beating a weak campaigner in her party’s third successive presidential term.

It’s possible that the demographics favouring the Democrats will save Clinton in such a scenario, and many things could change between now and then, but it would almost certainly be a tough fight.

If I was Hillary I would be more worried by what was happening in the Republic contest than on the Democrat side.

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The Slow Bern

I’m seeing a lot of posts from Sanders supporters saying he can still win the nomination, and then the presidency. I consider this delusional. But that doesn’t mean I don’t think Sanders can win, provided by winning you mean something much larger. I think Sanders has a good chance of being remembered as a harbinger for a substantial shift left within both the Democrats and wider American politics.

It’s true that most of Clinton’s best states have voted. I wouldn’t be surprised if Sanders managed to win the majority of votes from now on. But to actually win (even if the Superdelegates vote in line with their states, not their preferences) he has to go close to 60% of the remaining votes. That includes states like New York, California and Pennsylvania and New Jersey all of which he will need a miracle even to win. If he scrapes through with 51% in those he needs almost 70% of the rest. Not going to happen.

That doesn’t mean, however, that the Sanders’ campaign will disappear. In the long run I think Sanders will be judged ahead of his time, just as he was with his support for many of the issues now widely accepted in the Democrats.

One of the most noticeable features of the Democrat primaries has been how big a difference age makes to voting. I can’t remember ever seeing a losing candidate get more than 80% of the under 30-vote, as Sanders did in Iowa and Nevada.  His win in Michigan was built in large part on young voters being similarly strong for him, and coming out in greater numbers than anticipated. Only in the south is Sanders not dominating the youth vote to an unprecedented extent.

A lot of people looking at this are probably thinking, “sure, but the young always lean left, then they get older.” We’ve all heard the sayings, “Not a socialist at 20, got no heart, still a socialist at forty, got no brain,” “A conservative is a liberal with teenage daughters” etc etc ad nauseum. The perception that it is normal for people to move to the right as they age isn’t entirely untrue, but it is greatly exaggerated.

There is a much longer essay in why people believe this exaggeration, but for the moment I will just say this: The evidence is that generations that start left tend to stay to the left, even if they experience some shift back towards the middle. This applies even for those, such as the people who came of age in the late 60s, who were politicized primarily by an issue that subsequently went away.

Meanwhile, those people who reached voting age under Eisenhower and Reagan started off voting Republican, and have kept on doing so ever since. (more up to date but not as clear graphic here) In fact, while young voters have not stood to the right of the electorate for a long time, there have been a number of elections, such as 1984 and 1992, where they were in line with the overall vote. The youth vote didn’t really become influential until 2008.

Nor is this just about the votes. Numerous studies have been done of the values of different American age cohorts, and they have found that those who came of age in the 80s stand well to the right of those both older and younger than them.

These studies make clear that the millenials backing Sanders are not just caught up in something cool – their values are well to the left of anyone in the last 40 years, and those turning 18 appear to be further left still.

With time, this group is going to become larger and more influential. It’s possible that those who are currently aged around 10, for example, will see the world differently, but it is almost certain that at least those slightly too young to vote now will also be strongly left.

Moreover, while the ending of the Vietnam war cooled the passions of the early Baby Boomers, and ushered in a more conservative era for their younger siblings, millenial politics is being driven by racism, sexism, wealth inequality and global warming. Sadly, none of them are likely to go away.

_88952230_88952229 Those who follow in Sanders’ footsteps may have the same problems the Democrats currently do; turning out their supporters at mid-term elections, and left wing voters being badly distributed for winning control of Congress. However, when it comes to electing future presidents – and probably Congress – in those years, the left will be very well positioned.

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Senate Voting Reform. Don’t Listen To Me

Most of what you read about Senate reform will be self-interested, or at least biased. That includes anything I could say. Not so much because of benefits to the Greens, although that is part of the story. Mostly, however out of personal self interest.

My expertise has meant that, hard as I try to get out, I have put under a lot of pressure to be involved with preference negotiations, and I find them repulsive and traumatic. Being placed in a situation where you have a choice between taking a deal you find ethically doubtful and throwing away the hard work of thousands of people which which you expect to be sufficient to get a candidate 80% of a quota is horrible. Even more horrible when you know that not taking the deal will likely mean some shonky candidate with a tenth of your candidate’s support will get in because they are happy to take the same deal. I don’t want to be back there, and naturally that biases my view on the reforms.

Therefore I urge everyone to consult the small number of people who both understand these reforms and don’t have any significant self-interest in the outcome: Antony Green, Charles Richardson, William Bowe, Henry SchlectaKevin Bonham and Sarah John of Fairvote.

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I think so far the score is five favour with one still to declare. All the criticism I have seen has come from people either with a very significant stake in the fight, or who have made clear they simply don’t understand the way the system works/will work.

That is not to say the proposal is perfect. Nobel prize-winning economist Kenneth Arrow proved that it is impossible to design a perfect voting system, and the size of the states as electorates and relative disengagement with the Senate mean that even some options that are close to perfect in principal don’t work too well here.

Nevertheless, I would argue that the version that will be voted on this week is about as good as one could get – greatly improved, by the way, by the efforts of the psephologists referred to above to get reform of the below the line voting added in.

The idea of putting more power in the hands of the voters, and less in the hands of party machine men (and just as with psephology, it almost always is men) is pretty much a no-brainer.

Consequently the arguments against have pretty much been:

1) It could give the coalition control

2) It could reduce diversity by extinguishing minor parties

3) The process has been rushed

I agree with 3), but the reason it has been rushed is largely because some of the cross-benchers were threatening to hold the government to ransom, refusing to support legislation they agreed with because they resented the possibility of losing their place in parliament. I can’t think of much better evidence that these individuals (and I note not all the cross-benchers seemed to be part of this) shouldn’t have been there in the first place. Hardly a reason to oppose good legislation just because it happened a bit fast.

On the other two points; as noted, there are others who you should believe rather than me. But the evidence is that these fears are overblown. Yes the coalition could gain control, but they did this under the current system in 2004. The real question is: Is them gaining control more likely under the proposal than the existing system. It’s actually very hard to say. One can construct scenarios where the proposed system helps them, but others where it does not. There is a fair chance that under the proposal they would not have won control in their own right in 2004, and certainly they would not have had the extra vote of Steve Fielding in the cases where they couldn’t get all of their official team to back them.

Nor will all minor parties miss out. The Palmer United Party would easily have won a seat in Queensland at the last election under the proposal, and possibly WA as well. And of course there is Xenophon, who would have a mate there as well under the proposal. If minor parties form coalitions, as Antony Green has suggested, it is likely we will have quite a few of them elected in future, and a good thing too.

There is a long term trend away from the Coalition and Labor, and the factors driving this will continue. As time goes on we will see more votes for independents and minor parties, and more of these people elected.

What will change is that the minor party that will win will be the one with real support, rather than one that flukes it, or gets a lot of preferences because they lie to people about their true positions. Do people seriously think this is a bad thing?

 

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